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Radical Enlightenment, Pragmatic Enlightenment, Democratic Enlightenment, Scottish 
Enlightenment and now Principled Enlightenment. The historiographical category of 
Enlightenment is so accommodating, so flexible, so adaptable that it is like a gift that 
keeps on giving. With no fixed chronological or geographical boundaries, with no 
thematic or doctrinal core, with no determinate number –– is it singular or plural? –– 
and with the intrinsic authority of being an actors’ category, the Enlightenment has, is 
and will continue to reinvent itself, or at least scholars will continue to apply it in new 
and fertile ways. And this is a good thing: there is nothing inherently wrong or 
methodologically suspect in the fact that there are multifarious applications of this 
historiographical category. As long as historians apply it self-consciously and with 
deference to the historical record, I say, let all flowers bloom. 
But was there a Principled Enlightenment? And if so, what could this be? Here 
is a range of questions that one might ask. In what sense was the Enlightenment a 
principled era? What roles do principles play in Enlightenment thought? What are the 
determinate principles of the Enlightenment or of particular thinkers of the 
Enlightenment? These are big questions, questions that require broad surveys and 
Forthcoming in Rethinking the Enlightenment: Between History, Politics, and Philosophy  
eds G. Boucher and H. M. Lloyd, Lanham: Lexington, 2018 
 
2 
comparisons and the study of a vast range of sources. Rather than attempt a 
comprehensive answer to even one of these questions, what I hope to do here is more 
modest. After presenting some evidence of the nature and importance of principles 
across a variety of disciplines, countries and times, I shall focus on one facet of the 
theory of principles as manifested in the writings of two French philosophes, Étienne 
Bonnot de Condillac and Jean Le Rond d’Alembert. I want to offer this as a case study, 
one that has analogues in other thinkers and in other locales, in order to argue for the 
broader claim that principles played a central role in Enlightenment thought; that the 
Enlightenment was indeed a Principled Enlightenment. So let us turn to a sampling of 
the evidence for the general importance of principles in the Enlightenment. 
Let us start with book titles. What do these eighteenth-century English book 
titles have in common? George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of 
Human Knowledge, 1710; David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, 1751; and Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of 
Common Sense, 1764. Of course, it is that they all have the term “principles” in their 
titles. 
When we turn to ECCO we find that over 1,100 books printed in Britain in the 
eighteenth century have the term “principles” in their titles. Gallica lists around 580 
books in French between 1700 and 1800 with the term principe in the title and a 
sampling of these suggests that the majority are relevant to the study of principles in the 
Enlightenment. Interestingly, there is not one book with the word “Enlightenment” in its 
title published in English in the period. Nor are there any in French with “siècle des 
lumières”. This in itself is an interesting commentary on just how eighteenth-century 
studies is dominated by one particular historiography. For I am yet to encounter a book 
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about the period with the term “principles” in its title and yet books with the term 
“Enlightenment” continue to proliferate. 
Of course, book titles, ngrams and Google searches are superficial: a handy way 
in to a subject but too shallow to give us a genuine understanding of the status of a 
concept like principles. For that we need to turn to the historical and textual record of 
the period. To that end, let us start with a comment on the final section (Part VII) of 
Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments of 1759. In the opening paragraph on “Of 
Systems of Moral Philosophy” Smith claims: 
From some one or other of those principles which I have been endeavouring to 
unfold, every system of morality that ever had any reputation in the world has, 
perhaps, ultimately been derived. As they are all of them, in this respect founded 
upon natural principles, they are all of them in some measure in the right. But as 
many of them are derived from a partial and imperfect view of nature, there are 
many of them too in some respects in the wrong.1  
Smith’s view is that all systems of moral philosophy are based upon principles. The 
means by which they are formed and the manner by which they are evaluated is in terms 
of their principles. Principles are at the heart of Smith’s conception of moral philosophy. 
Around the time that Smith was writing The Theory of Moral Sentiments Jean 
Le Rond d’Alembert was also making claims about the importance of principles. In his 
article on “The elements of the sciences” in the Encyclopedia, d’Alembert uses the term 
“principle” (principe) forty-one times. In fact, this article contains a theory of 
knowledge acquisition that has principles at its core. It begins with the following claim: 
                                               
1 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (London, 1759), 413–14 (my emphasis). 
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In general, we call the elements of a whole the primitive and original parts of 
which we suppose the whole is made up. In order to carry this notion over into 
the Sciences in general and to determine how we are to understand the idea of 
the basic elements of any particular science, let us suppose that the science in 
question has been treated completely in a text, so that we can have immediate 
and concrete access to those propositions, both general and particular, that make 
up that science, and that such propositions be organized in the most natural and 
rigorous way possible. Let us then suppose that these propositions follow 
coherently one from the other, so that each depends uniquely and directly upon 
the preceding ones, and that it does not depend upon any other principles than 
those that make up the preceding propositions. In such a case, as we have noted 
in the preliminary discourse, each proposition will be simply the translation of 
the first, presented differently. Everything could therefore be reduced to that first 
proposition, and we could regard it as the basic element of that particular science 
since the science would be totally subsumed in that first proposition. If each of 
the sciences we are concerned with shared that characteristic, the elements 
would be as easy to present as to learn.2 
                                               
2 Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d’Alembert (eds.), Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire 
raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers (University of Chicago: ARTFL 
Encyclopédie Projet, Spring 2010 Edition [1751–72]) http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/. 
Translation from Jean Le Rond D’Alembert and Jean de La Chapelle, “Elements of the 
Sciences,” in The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d’Alembert Collaborative Translation 
Project, trans. Lauren Yoder (Ann Arbor: Michigan Publishing, University of Michigan 
Library, 2011) [http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.did2222.0001.133], 5: 491 (my 
emphasis). Originally published as “Elemens des Sciences,” Encyclopédie ou 
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So far this is the standard Aristotelian theory of knowledge acquisition in which a 
science or scientia is a set of propositions that are ultimately derived from a small set of 
principles specific to that science.3 Thus, he says “propositions follow coherently one 
from the other, so that each depends uniquely and directly upon the preceding ones, and 
that it does not depend upon any other principles than those that make up the preceding 
propositions”. However, d’Alembert then introduces a new twist, a claim that is not part 
of the age-old theory:  
if we were able to observe without interruption the invisible chain that links all 
the objects of our knowledge, the elements of all sciences could be reduced to 
one unique principle, whose consequences would be the elements of each 
particular science.4 
The claim is that there is one unique principle (un principe unique) underlying 
all of the sciences. This is an extraordinary claim. Where does it come from and what 
does he think that principle might be? His allusion to the “Preliminary Discourse” of the 
                                                                                                                                         
Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers (Paris, 1755), 5:491–497. 
For an earlier reference to principles as the elements of the sciences, see: Jean Le Rond 
D’Alembert, “Preliminary Discourse” to the Encyclopedia of Diderot, trans. and intro. 
by Richard N. Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985 [1751]), 119. 
3 See: Peter R. Anstey, “Introduction,” in Peter R. Anstey (ed.), The Idea of Principles 
in Early Modern Thought: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2017), 
1-15. 
4 Diderot and D’Alembert, Encyclopédie, 5: 491. See also: D’Alembert, “Preliminary 
Discourse”, 29. D’Alembert also uses the chain metaphor in the “Preliminary 
Discourse”. See: D’Alembert, “Preliminary Discourse”, 5. This also happens in his 
article on “Cosmology”. See: Diderot and D’Alembert, Encyclopédie, 4: 294. 
Forthcoming in Rethinking the Enlightenment: Between History, Politics, and Philosophy  
eds G. Boucher and H. M. Lloyd, Lanham: Lexington, 2018 
 
6 
Encyclopedia in this passage suggests that we should look there. And, indeed, further 
elements of d’Alembert’s theory of principles are found there. 
it is not at all by vague and arbitrary hypotheses that we can hope to know 
nature; it is by thoughtful study of phenomena, by the comparisons we make 
among them, by the art of reducing, as much as that may be possible, a large 
number of phenomena to a single one that can be regarded as their principle.5 
We will come back to the anti-hypothetical flourish. For now, the key point is the 
relation between phenomena and principles. Although D’Alembert is using the term 
“phenomena” slightly differently to the way that Newton does, he is almost certainly 
expressing a Newtonian point here.6 An example of phenomena being reducible to a 
principle might be the tables of planetary observations (phenomena) are reducible to the 
principle that planets move in elliptical orbits (Kepler’s first law of planetary motions). 
He goes on:  
Indeed, the more one reduces the number of principles of a science, the more 
one gives them scope, and since the object of a science is necessarily fixed, the 
principles applied to that object will be so much the more fertile as they are 
fewer in number.7 
Here is the link with the claim that there is one unique principle in the article on the 
“Elements of the Sciences”. D’Alembert is committed to the view that as the number of 
principles of a science diminishes, so the fecundity of the remaining principles increases. 
Let us call this Principle Minimalism. This too is an extraordinary claim. What 
                                               
5 D’Alembert, “Preliminary Discourse”, 22. 
6 See: Kirsten Walsh, “Newton’s epistemic triad” (PhD dissertation: University of Otago, 
2014), §4.3. 
7 D’Alembert, “Preliminary Discourse”, 22. 
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precedent is there for it and where does it come from? His next comment in the 
“Preliminary Discourse” provides a link to another clue: 
This reduction which, moreover, makes them easier to understand, constitutes 
the true “systematic spirit”. One must be very careful not to mistake this for the 
“spirit of system”, with which it does not always agree.8 
So the reduction of principles leading to increasing fecundity is the true way to 
develop a system. And this approach is not to be confused with the spirit of system, 
which d’Alembert goes on famously to criticise later in the “Preliminary Discourse”. 
There, the pernicious systems, according to d’Alembert, are based upon hypotheses and 
“frivolous conjectures” whereas a true science, such as natural philosophy (physique) 
“is ... confined solely to observations and to calculations”. “Thousands of experiments 
prove how dangerous the use of systems is in the other sciences”.9 For the historian of 
early modern experimental philosophy these tropes have a familiar ring and we will 
return to them in due course. Meanwhile, d’Alembert’s critique of the spirit of system 
takes us naturally to Condillac’s Treatise on Systems of 1749, for, as he claims in the 
“Preliminary Discourse”, “[o]ne of our best philosophers seems to have delivered the 
death blow to it”.10 
We turn then to Condillac’s Treatise on Systems which supposedly dealt a 
deathblow to the spirit of systems. It opens with a definition of a system: 
A system is nothing other than the arrangement of different parts of an art or 
science in an order in which they all lend each other support and in which the 
                                               
8 D’Alembert, “Preliminary Discourse”, 22-3. 
9 D’Alembert, “Preliminary Discourse”, 95. 
10 D’Alembert, “Preliminary Discourse”, 94.  
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last ones are explained by the first ones. Parts that explain other parts are called 
principles, and the fewer principles a system has the more perfect it is. It is even 
desirable to reduce all principles to a single one.11 
The conception of a system and the ideal of a single principle to which all others can be 
reduced are virtually identical to d’Alembert’s conception of a science as expressed in 
his article on the “Elements of the Sciences”. The claim that the fewer principles the 
more perfect the system parallels d’Alembert’s Principle Minimalism in the 
“Preliminary Discourse”. So d’Alembert was not alone in his theory of principles and 
his desire for an ultimate, fecund principle.  
What could be driving this? And where do these views about principles come 
from? The answer to these questions will take us in two different directions. On the one 
hand, there is the broader context of the rejection of systems over the longue durée 
which went hand-in-hand with the emergence of experimental philosophy in Britain 
from the 1660s. Condillac’s Treatise on Systems and d’Alembert’s enthusiastic 
endorsement of it should be seen as the high-water mark of this anti-system movement. 
And Condillac’s and d’Alembert’s theories of principles are best understood as a 
development of the new approach to knowledge acquisition that was pursued and 
theorised by the experimental philosophers.  
On the other hand, there are the actual unique principles that Condillac and 
d’Alembert claim to have discovered. Their identification of these particular principles 
is in itself an explanation, whether justified or not, of their theory of principles and their 
rejection of alternative approaches to constructing systems. Thus, once both this broader 
                                               
11 Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, Philosophical Writings of Étienne Bonnot, Abbé de 
Condillac, trans Franklin Philip (Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1982), 1. 
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context is in place and their favoured unique principles are in view, we will be in a 
position to assess points of continuity and points of innovation in these two exemplars 
of the Principled Enlightenment. Let us turn then to the anti-systems movement in 
France. 
 
Origins of the critique of systems 
I claimed above that the context in which we must understand the anti-systems 
movement in France in the mid-eighteenth century is the critique of systems that had 
been part and parcel of the outlook of experimental philosophers since the emergence of 
the movement in England in the 1660s. Indeed, one of the earliest expressions of this is 
in Boyle’s “Proëmial Essay” to his Certain Physiological Essays which was written 
circa 1657. 
Boyle begins with an assessment of some of the leading natural philosophies 
that were of influence in his day: 
I am very sensible of my being far from having such a stock of Experiments and 
Observations, as I judge requisite to write Systematically; and I am apt to impute 
many of the Deficiencies to be met with in the Theories and Reasonings of such 
great Wits as Aristotle, Campanella, and some other celebrated Philosophers, 
chiefly to this very thing, that they have too hastily, and either upon a few 
Observations, or at least without a competent number of Experiments, presum’d 
to establish Principles, and deliver Axioms.12 
                                               
12 Robert Boyle, The Works of Robert Boyle, 14 vols, Michael Hunter and E. B. Davis 
(eds.) (London: Pickering and Chatto, 1999–2000), 2: 13 (my emphasis). 
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The problem with Aristotle and Campanella, for example, is that they “superstructed” 
their systems on principles and axioms that are based upon too slim an evidential 
foundation. The problem lies not in the adequacy of the ideal of a demonstrative science 
based upon principles and axioms, but rather in the inadequate evidential grounds for 
the principles and axioms themselves. Natural philosophers should: 
set themselves diligently and industriously to make Experiments and collect 
Observations, without being over-forward to establish Principles and Axioms, 
believing it uneasie to erect such Theories as are capable to explicate all the 
Phaenomena of Nature, before they have been able to take notice of the tenth 
part of those Phaenomena that are to be explicated.13 
Returning to his point about quantitative evidence Boyle asserts: 
That then that I wish for, as to Systems, is this, That men in the first place would 
forbear to establish any Theory, till they have consulted with (though not a fully 
competent number of Experiments, such as may afford them all the Phaenomena 
to be explicated by that Theory, yet) a considerable number of Experiments in 
proportion to the comprehensiveness of the Theory to be erected on them.14 
In summary then, Boyle’s position is the following. First, observation and 
experiment have epistemic priority: one should accept only those principles and axioms 
in natural philosophy that are based upon sufficient observational and experimental 
evidence and one should avoid constructing a system without recourse to observation 
and experiment. Secondly, once a system is constructed, one should be prepared to 
revise it in the light of new experimental evidence. These two claims are the core 
                                               
13 Boyle, Works, 2: 14 (my emphasis).  
14 Boyle, Works, 2: 14.  
Forthcoming in Rethinking the Enlightenment: Between History, Politics, and Philosophy  
eds G. Boucher and H. M. Lloyd, Lanham: Lexington, 2018 
 
11 
doctrines of experimental philosophy. They account for its emphasis on experiment and 
for its decrying of speculation and hypotheses, and they underwrite the pervasive 
criticism of systems of natural philosophy, otherwise known as speculative philosophy, 
in early modern British natural philosophy. Thus, we find Sir Robert Moray putting 
forward the following proposal about the business of the Royal Society in the early 
1660s:  
This Society will not own any Hypothesis, systeme, or doctrine of the principles 
of Naturall philosophy, proposed, or maintained by any Philosopher Auncient or 
Moderne, nor the explication of any phaenomenon, where recourse must be had 
to Originall causes, … Nor dogmatically define, nor fixe Axiomes of 
Scientificall things, but will question and canvas all opinions[,] adopting nor 
adhering to none, till by mature debate & clear arguments, chiefly such as are 
deduced from legittimate experiments, the trueth of such positions be 
demonstrated invincibly.15 
This is not the place to adduce the copious evidence for the prevalence of these views in 
Britain, however, an excerpt from Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education of 
1693 should give the flavour of the view:16 
But I would not deterr any one from the study of Nature, because all the 
                                               
15 Michael Hunter, Science and the Shape of Orthodoxy: Intellectual Change in Late-
Seventeenth-Century Britain (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1995), 173 (my emphasis). 
16 For further evidence, see: Peter R. Anstey, “Experimental Versus Speculative Natural 
Philosophy,” in Peter R. Anstey and John A. Schuster (eds.), The Science of Nature in 
the Seventeenth Century: Patterns of Change in Early Modern Natural Philosophy 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 215–42. 
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Knowledge we have, or possibly can have of it, cannot be brought into a Science. 
There are very many things in it, that are convenient and necessary to be known 
to a Gentleman: And a great many other, that will abundantly reward the Pains 
of the Curious with Delight and Advantage. But these, I think, are rather to be 
found amongst such Writers, as have imploy’d themselves in making rational 
Experiments and Observations, than in starting barely speculative Systems. 
Such Writings therefore, as many of Mr. Boyle’s are, with others, that have writ 
of Husbandry, Planting, Gardening, and the like, may be fit for a Gentleman, 
when he has a little acquainted himself with some of the Systems of the Natural 
Philosophy in Fashion.17 
 
 One consequence of the decrying of systems and hypotheses amongst 
experimental philosophers was the emergence of a disregard for and, in some quarters, a 
contempt for metaphysics. Newton’s negative attitude to the metaphysics of the schools 
is typical in British philosophy through to the mid-eighteenth century.18 So, for example, 
just three years before the appearance of d’Alembert’s “Preliminary Discourse” Hume, 
who was attempting to apply the method of experimental philosophy to the moral 
sciences, famously pleaded in the first Enquiry: 
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for 
instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity 
or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter 
                                               
17 John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, eds John W. and Jean S. Yolton 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989 [1693]), 248 (my alteration of emphasis). 
18 See: Dmitri Levitin, “Newton and Scholastic Philosophy,” British Journal for the 
History of Science 49 (2016): 53–77. 
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of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: For it can contain 
nothing but sophistry and illusion.19 
Yet it bears pointing out that Hume is not dismissing metaphysics tout court here. For 
one of the lessons of Section One of the Enquiry is that we “must cultivate true 
metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate” (Hume 2007, 
8). 
Now the early experimental philosophers, following Francis Bacon,20 proposed 
an alternative two-step theory of knowledge acquisition which involved first, the 
collection and ordering of observations and experiments and only once that was near 
completion, second, theorising on the basis of those experimental facts. Their criticism 
of systems and their alternative two-step method, founded on natural history, were well 
known in Paris from the 1660s, not least through the efforts of Moray and of Henry 
Oldenburg, the indefatigable Secretary of the Royal Society.21 Once again, space does 
not permit a survey of the manifestation of these methodological ideas in France, where 
                                               
19 David Hume, (2007) An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter 
Millican (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 [1748]), 120. 
20 For Bacon’s criticisms of philosophical systems, see: Idols of the Theatre, New 
Organon, book I, aphorisms 61–7, Francis Bacon, The Instauration magna Part II: 
Novum organum and Associated Texts, ed. Graham Rees (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2004), 95–109. For the two-step model, see, for example, A Preparative to a Natural 
and Experimental History, ibid., 455–7.  
21 See: Christiaan Huygens, Oeuvres complètes de Christiaan Huygens, 22 vols (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1888–1950), 4: 327, 6: 95–6 and 19: 268. For Christiaan 
Huygens’ correspondence with Sir Robert Moray, see: Huygens, Oeuvres, 3: passim. 
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experimental philosophy failed to get a proper foothold until the mid-1730s.22 
Nevertheless, it is worth providing some steppingstones of the dissemination of these 
methodological ideas and attitudes in the period leading up to Condillac and d’Alembert. 
We begin with Fontenelle, the perpetual Secretary of the Académie des Sciences, 
who endorses the two-step method in 1699 in the Histoire du renouvellement de 
l’Académie Royale des Sciences, as follows: 
the Academy is only at the stage of gathering an ample store of well-founded 
observations and facts, which will one day become the basis for a System. For 
systematic natural philosophy it must refrain from building its edifice until 
experimental natural philosophy [Physique expérimentale] is able to furnish it 
with the necessary materials.23 
Turning from the two-step method to the critique of systems, we find a clear 
statement of the standard position of the experimental philosophers in the classicist, 
Nicolas Fréret’s “Reflections on the study of ancient history”:  
Philosophers understand by this word “system” an assemblage of certified facts, 
demonstrated truths and evident propositions, which, linked together in a natural 
and necessary relation, form a single body of knowledge, all parts of which 
                                               
22 Peter R. Anstey, “D’Alembert, the ‘Preliminary Discourse’ and Experimental 
Philosophy,” Intellectual History Review 24 (2014): 495–516.  
23 Cited from Roger Hahn The Anatomy of a Scientific Institution: The Paris Academy 
of Sciences, 1666–1803 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 33 (with 
modifications); see Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle, (1708) Histoire du 
Renouvellement de l’Académie Royale des Sciences (Paris, 1708), sigs ciijr–v. See also 
the comments of François-Xavier Bon 1710 cited in Terrall 2014, 17. 
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support one another and lend each other a reciprocal strength and clarity. 
Therefore the value of a system depends upon the position and strength of each 
one of its parts; if any one gives way, the whole edifice will soon crumble and 
collapse of its own weight. 
Fréret’s definition of “system” is fairly close to the standard theory of a scientia or 
demonstrative science and he is well attuned to the danger of the principles of such a 
system being undermined. He goes on: 
I do not mean in what I say here [in the previous two paragraphs] to confuse the 
love of system with that of philosophical spirit [esprit philosophique] which the 
exact sciences have brought to the fore in our own age. Of this there is no better 
evidence than the record of the two most renowned philosophical societies in 
Europe: the Royal Society in London and the Academy of Sciences in Paris. ... 
The spirit of philosophy is very different from the spirit of system; the former is 
as necessary as the latter is dangerous. ... True [historical] criticism is nothing 
other than [natural] philosophic enquiry applied to the study of facts.24 
I want to suggest that so widespread is the new methodology of experimental 
philosophers that the critique of systems and the application of natural philosophical 
methodology to the discipline of history, are evidence that the methodological 
orientation of experimental philosophy preceded the processes by which French natural 
philosophers came explicitly to identify with the method of physique expérimentale and 
call themselves practitioners of experimental philosophy. By the mid-1730s, however, 
                                               
24 J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1: The Enlightenments of Edward 
Gibbon, 1737–1764 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 159–60 
(modified). 
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all of this began to change. Take, for example, the Preface to Buffon’s translation of 
Stephen Hales’ Vegetable Staticks, published just four years after Fréret’s “Reflexions”. 
In it we find the following exhortation: 
let us constantly collect experiments, and flee, if it is possible, from the system-
building mentality, at least until we are well informed. Someday we will be able 
to “... situate these materials with confidence, and even if we should not be so 
fortunate as to be able to build the edifice in its entirety, the materials will 
certainly serve us as foundation for it, and perhaps even for extending it beyond 
our hopes”. This is the method my author [Hales] has followed. It is that of the 
great Newton; it is that which Verulam [Bacon], Galileo, Boyle and Stahl have 
recommended and embraced.25 
All of this goes to show that Condillac’s Treatise on Systems is hardly an innovative 
work in its methodological orientation: he is harping on the same themes as Boyle had 
done ninety years before. What is innovative in Condillac is not the rejection of systems, 
not the anti-hypotheticalism, not the opposition to abstract principles and his rejection 
of innate principles, but his commitment to Principle Minimalism and the fecundity of 
the one unique principle of the system. 
 
Condillac’s and d’Alembert’s principles 
In his Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge published three years before the 
Treatise on Systems, Condillac claimed to have discovered the unique principle for 
                                               
25 John Lyon and Philip Sloan (eds.), From Natural History to the History of Nature: 
Readings from Buffon and His Critics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1981), 38.  
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unlocking the origins of human knowledge. He claims as much in the Introduction to 
this work: 
The success of these inquiries [in the Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge] 
depends entirely on the results of observation, and our only aim should be the 
discovery of a fundamental fact of experience that no one can cast doubt on and 
that is sufficient to explain all the rest. It ought to point clearly to the source of 
our understanding, to the materials from which it is formed, to the principle that 
activates the materials, the means we use in that process, and the manner in 
which we should employ them. I believe I have found the solution to all these 
problems in the connection of ideas, either with signs or among themselves. The 
reader may decide whether I am correct in the course of his reading of this work. 
It is evident that my design is to reduce everything that pertains to the human 
mind to a single principle, and that this principle shall be neither a vague 
proposition, nor an abstract maxim, nor a gratuitous supposition, but a firm fact 
of experience whose consequences will all be confirmed by new acts of 
experience.26 
If we examine the underlined clauses in reverse order, we find first that 
Condillac’s plan is to reduce everything pertaining to the human understanding to a 
single principle (un seul principe). This is entirely consonant with what he proclaims is 
the correct approach to system construction in the Treatise on Systems three years later. 
Second, we should note that he believes he has found that principle: it is the connection 
of ideas with each other and with signs, i.e. words. Third, it is important to emphasise 
that this principle is acquired by experience and confirmed by experience. Later he goes 
                                               
26 Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, trans. Hans 
Aarsleff, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 [1746]), 5 (my emphasis).  
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on to contrast this with the abstract principles of metaphysicians and others that are 
supposedly a priori propositions or even innate knowledge. These latter sorts of 
principles are, following Locke, dismissed as dangerous foundations of knowledge and 
the basis of false systems.27  
This is not the place to assess the adequacy, even the coherence, of Condillac’s 
claims concerning his single principle of the mind. Our concern rather is merely to show 
that the theory of principles elaborated in the later Treatise on Systems was not empty 
methodological rhetoric, but backed up by this concrete instance in Condillac’s own 
well-articulated theory of the origins of knowledge and the operations of the 
understanding. 
A similar claim can be made concerning d’Alembert. For, prior to the 
“Preliminary Discourse” of 1751 and prior to his reading of Condillac’s Treatise on 
Systems, d’Alembert himself had enunciated a new principle of mechanics in his 
Treatise on Dynamics of 1743, the eponymous D’Alembert’s Principle. Indeed, the sub-
title to this work ought to alert us to the nature of d’Alembert’s theory of principles. The 
work is entitled:  
Treatise on Dynamics in which the Laws of Equilibrium and Motion of Bodies 
are reduced to the smallest possible number and demonstrated in a new manner, 
and where a general Principle is given for finding the Motion of several Bodies 
which act on one another in any way.28 
                                               
27 See: Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, Traité des systèmes (The Hague, 1749), chap. VI.  
28 D’Alembert’s 1743 title page reads: Traité de dynamique, dans lequel les loix de 
l’equlibre & du Mouvement des Corps sont réduites au plus petit nombre possible, & 
démontrées d’une maniére nouvelle, & où l’on donne un Principe général pour trouver 
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That general principle is, of course, D’Alembert’s Principle, a principle in dynamics 
that was an important advance and formed the centrepiece of part two of the Treatise on 
Dynamics. As Thomas Hankins pointed out, d’Alembert went on to make rather bold 
claims about his principle:  
there is no problem in dynamics that cannot be resolved easily almost as a game 
by means of this principle.29  
D’Alembert did, in fact, claim that his three laws of dynamics were the fewest number 
of laws required to solve all the problems of dynamics and, interestingly, his principle 
was derived from the second and third laws rather than being the fundamental principle 
upon which the whole of mechanics was founded. Thus, in his mind in 1743 he had a 
concrete instance of a science that conformed to the more abstract theory of principles 
elaborated in the later “Preliminary Discourse” and his article on the “Elements of the 
Sciences” in the Encyclopedia.  
Moreover, all of this would have been reinforced in the minds of Condillac and 
d’Alembert by Maupertius’ Principle of Least Action which first appeared in a paper 
read to the Acadèmie des Sciences in 1744, one year after the appearance of 
d’Alembert’s Treatise on Dynamics. Maupertuis published it in a paper in the 
proceedings of the Berlin Acadèmie in 1746 and in a more elaborate form in his 
                                                                                                                                         
le Mouvement de plusieurs Corps qui agissent les uns sur les autres, d’une maniére 
quelconque. See: Jean Le Rond D’Alembert, Traité de dynamique (Paris, 1743) (my 
emphasis in translation). 
29 Quoted from: Thomas Hankins, Jean d’Alembert: Science and Enlightenment 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 192. See also: Diderot and D’Alembert, Encyclopédie, 
5: 175.  
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Cosmologie of 1750.30 D’Alembert gives the principle a generous endorsement in his 
article “Action” in the first volume of the Encyclopedia of 1751 which appeared with 
his “Preliminary Discourse”.31  
These principles of Condillac and d’Alembert, therefore, go a long way to 
explaining why they were both committed to one unique and explanatorily rich 
principle and to Principle Minimalism: the view that the fewer the principles of a 
science are, the more fecund they are. Yet there is a deeper and more significant 
explanation of their commitment to principle minimalism: namely, their conception of 
the science of metaphysics. 
 
Principle Minimalism and metaphysics 
Principle Minimalism was certainly legitimized by developments in natural philosophy 
at the hands of d’Alembert and Maupertuis. And, moreover, there is evidence of a 
general trend in the mid-eighteenth century in French intellectual life to appeal to 
ultimate or primary principles. Take, for example, Charles Batteux’s The Fine Arts 
Reduced to a Single Principle (2015 [1749]), a work which argues for the primacy of 
the principle of the imitation of belle nature as an explanation of the production of 
works of art, and a work whose influence is found in the “Preliminary Discourse”.32 Yet 
                                               
30 See: Maupertuis 1746 [1748] and 1750. Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, “Les 
loix du mouvement et du repos déduites d’un principe métaphysique,” Histoire de 
l’Académie Royale des Sciences et Belles Lettres, 1746 (Berlin, 1748), 267–94; and, 
Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Essai de cosmologie (Berlin, 1750). 
31 Diderot and D’Alembert, Encyclopédie, 1: 119–20.  
32 See: D’Alembert, “Preliminary Discourse”, 36–9, 45, 51 and 55. 
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in the cases of Condillac and d’Alembert their commitment to Principle Minimalism 
was not simply the contingent outcome of their work in the theory of knowledge and 
rational mechanics, respectively. Rather it was deeply grounded in their conception of 
metaphysics and its relation to the sciences. 
As we saw above, a corollary of the critique of speculative philosophy and its 
opposition to systems, was that metaphysics came in for harsh criticism in the first half 
of the eighteenth century. However, it should be pointed out that this admonishing of 
metaphysics was on the whole restricted to what Hume called abstruse and School 
metaphysics. It was not an outright rejection of metaphysics. It is important, therefore, 
not to generalise this context-specific anti-metaphysical stance to the discipline in 
general. A similar bivalent attitude to metaphysics prevailed in mid-eighteenth-century 
France. 
 Condillac famously distinguished two forms of metaphysics. First, there is that 
ambitious discipline whose practitioners aim at “solving all mysteries; nature, the 
essence of all beings, the most hidden causes” and so on.33 The Treatise on Systems is 
best interpreted as a critique of and corrective to the first enterprise. For in his treatise 
Condillac identifies three types of principles, namely abstract maxims, suppositions or 
hypotheses and experimentally verified principles. The first two are associated with the 
speculations of metaphysicians, while the third are the sort that he endorses.34 His 
submission on Monads,35 for the inaugural prize competition at the Berlin Academy in 
                                               
33 Condillac, Origin of Human Knowledge, 3.  
34 Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, Philosophical Writings of Etienne Bonnot, Abbé de 
Condillac, trans. Franklin Philip (Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1982), 1-3. 
35 See: Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, Les monades, ed. Laurence L. Bongie (Oxford: 
Editions Voltaire Foundation, 1980). 
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1746 is his attempt at the speculations of metaphysicians such as Leibniz. Secondly, 
there is the more modest enterprise that seeks to inquire into what is within reach of the 
human mind. Condillac’s Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge (published in the 
same year) is, in effect, an exercise in this second form of metaphysics, taking his 
inspiration from John Locke. Thus, the two different forms of metaphysics are deeply 
pursued in his two writings from 1746. 
 D’Alembert, for his part, also held a bipartite theory of the nature of metaphysics. He 
accorded metaphysics the premier place among the sciences in the “Preliminary 
Discourse”. In his and Diderot’s scheme for the system of knowledge, metaphysics is 
placed at the very top of the in the two main branches of sciences founded on the faculty 
of reason, namely the science of man and the science of nature.36 This reflects the 
twofold nature of metaphysics as articulated in the “Preliminary Discourse” itself. First, 
there is particular metaphysics (métaphysique particuliere), which is the science of the 
soul. It is concerned with the origin or generation of our ideas. For d’Alembert, Locke is 
the recent hero of this discipline: “he reduced metaphysics to what it really ought to be: 
the experimental physics of the soul”, and, of course, Condillac is its most able 
contemporary exponent.37 Secondly, there is general metaphysics (métaphysique 
générale). In the “Preliminary Discourse” the example of general metaphysics that is 
discussed is the science of body taken in its general or abstract sense. It is concerned 
with the general qualities of body such as impenetrability, mobility and extension. 
D’Alembert claims that the science of nature “ought to begin with the study of these 
properties ... which is, properly speaking, simply the metaphysics of bodies” (PD, 54).38 
                                               
36 D’Alembert, “Preliminary Discourse”, 144–5.  
37 D’Alembert, “Preliminary Discourse”, 84.  
38 See also: D’Alembert, “Preliminary Discourse”, 46. 
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That D’Alembert allows that the imagination has an ancillary role in metaphysics does 
not significantly affect these points.39 Then, in his article entitled “Elements of the 
sciences” in the Encyclopedia, d’Alembert articulates general metaphysics more clearly: 
Metaphysics ... is nothing more than the clear and precise exposition of the 
general and philosophical truths on which the principles of the science were 
founded. The simpler the metaphysics, the easier and more widespread, the more 
valuable it is.40 
In contrast to the more “rigourous” sense of the term that applies to spiritual beings such 
as the soul he speaks of “Metaphysics in a more general sense as that universal science 
which contains the principles of all the others”).41  
This distinction is maintained in his more philosophically rich treatment of 
metaphysics in his Elements of Philosophy of 1759 and the later “Eclaircissements” to 
the Elements of Philosophy that were published in 1776. In the Elements of Philosophy 
he devotes a whole chapter to metaphysics (chap. VI) and later a number of 
eclaircissements.42 The chapter on metaphysics is part of his coverage of the sciences of 
man, which also includes logic and morals. Its focus, therefore, is on particular 
metaphysics and so he claims there “the generation of our ideas belongs to metaphysics; 
                                               
39 D’Alembert, “Preliminary Discourse”, 51. 
40 Diderot and D’Alembert, Encyclopédie, 5: 492.  
41 Diderot and D’Alembert, Encyclopédie, 5: 492. 
42 See especially eclaircissements §I and §XV in: Jean Le Rond D’Alembert, Essai sur 
les éléments de philosophie, ed. Richard N. Schwab (Hildesheim: Olms, 1965 [1759]). 
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it is one of its principal objects”.43 Yet elsewhere in the book he also mentions general 
metaphysics. D’Alembert claims, “properly speaking, there is no science that does not 
have its metaphysics, if we understand by this word the general principles on which a 
science is founded” (Elements, 357). Moreover, as in the “Preliminary Discourse”, he 
discusses general metaphysics as it pertains to the science of body, even using it in his 
treatment of geometry to claim that as the science of body has a general metaphysics so 
too does geometry.44  
 Surprisingly, this twofold conception of metaphysics in the writings of 
d’Alembert seems to have been overlooked in some of the recent secondary literature. 
Christian Leduc, for example, claims that “the sole domain to which metaphysics 
should limit itself, at least for Condillac and d’Alembert, is that of the analysis of the 
cognitive capacities of the mind”.45 Leduc’s omission of d’Alembert’s conception of 
general metaphysics enables him to pit him against Maupertuis and Euler at the Berlin 
Academy (and we might add, against the Secretary of the Berlin Academy Samuel 
                                               
43 D’Alembert, Éléments, 124. The chapter on metaphysics is not restricted to the 
generation of ideas, but also covers the existence of external objects, existence of God 
and the nature of the soul. See: D’Alembert, Éléments, 31, 41 and 240 for the content of 
particular metaphysics and 357–8 for the claim that the term “metaphysics” properly 
applies to immaterial entities. 
44 D’Alembert, Éléments, 358. 
45 Christian Leduc, “La métaphysique de la nature à l’Académie de Berlin,” 
Philosophiques, 42 (2015), 13. He also speaks of Condillac’s and d’Alembert’s 
“reduction of the field of metaphysics to psychological questions about the sources and 
faculties of human knowledge”. See: Leduc, “Métaphysique,” 29. 
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Formey who was an even more outspoken advocate of metaphysics).46 Yet, there is no 
evidence that d’Alembert took an anti-metaphysical stance against Maupertius or Euler. 
Instead all the textual evidence confirms that he was an advocate of a twofold 
conception of metaphysics from 1751 until well beyond Maupertuis’ death in 1759. 
 A similar interpretation is found in the work of Mary Terrall. When discussing 
d’Alembert’s reaction to the place of Maupertuis’ Principle of Least Action in the 
latter’s Essay on Cosmology, Terrall claims “[in his Encyclopedia article “Action”] 
d’Alembert nonchalantly read the metaphysics out of the principle of least action ... 
pointedly downplaying Maupertuis’s insistence on the value of metaphysics for 
mechanics”.47 Then, in a footnote, she makes the further claim “D’Alembert’s 
objections to metaphysics solidified with time; by the second edition of his Traité de 
dynamique (1758), he commented negatively about Maupertuis’s use of metaphysics 
(albeit without naming him)”.48 Yet, it is not at all clear that d’Alembert is critically 
                                               
46 Formey claims, “Metaphysics is without contradiction the mother of the other 
sciences, the theory which provides the most general principles, the source of the 
evidence and the foundation of the certitude of our knowledge”. Formey goes on to 
differentiate this form of metaphysics from that of the Schools. See: Samuel Formey, 
“Preface” to Histoire de l’Académie Royale des Sciences et Belles Lettres, 1745 (Berlin, 
sigs., 1746), sigs (4r–)()(2v), (2r). 
47 Mary Terrall, The Man Who Flattened the Earth: Maupertuis and the Sciences in the 
Enlightenment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 291. 
48 Terrall, Flattened the Earth, n67. Terrall may well be influenced by Hankins’ 
interpretation of d’Alembert’s reaction to Maupertuis’ principle. Hankins claims that 
d’Alembert “categorically denounced the search for final causes and the physical laws 
derived from them,” citing the relevant passage in the Preface to the second edition of 
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alluding to Maupertuis in the relevant passage in the second edition of the Treatise on 
Dynamics. To be sure, he warns there against dangers of reasoning from final causes, 
just as Maupertuis had done in his paper of 1744 where he had Leibniz and Fermat in 
his sights.49 Additionally, d’Alembert criticises Descartes for deducing his erroneous 
collision laws from the law of conservation, just as Maupertuis had done in his 1746 
paper on “The accord between different laws of nature that until now seemed 
incompatible”.50 Yet there are no grounds here for claiming that d’Alembert’s position 
on final causes or on metaphysics in general differed significantly from that of 
Maupertuis, nor that this revision to the Preface to the Treatise on Dynamics is evidence 
of a shift against metaphysics in d’Alembert’s intellectual outlook.  
Thus, in his article on “Action” in the first volume of the Encyclopedia, 
d’Alembert praises Maupertuis, claiming that his works that deal with the Principle of 
Least Action “should focus the attention of all philosophers and we urge them to read 
these works and they will note that the author manages to ally the metaphysics of final 
                                                                                                                                         
D’Alembert’s Treatise on Dynamics from 1759. See: Thomas Hankins, Jean 
d’Alembert: Science and Enlightenment, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 54. One 
scholar who has taken d’Amembert’s account of metaphysics seriously is Véronique Le 
Ru. See: Véronique Le Ru, Jean Le Rond d’Alembert philosophe (Paris: Vrin, 1994), 
Part Two. 
49 Jean Le Rond D’Alembert, Traité de dynamique, 2nd edition (Paris, 1758),  xxx; 
Maupertuis, “Accord de différentes loix,” 425. 
50 D’Alembert, Traité de dynamique, 2nd edition, xxx; Pierre-Louis Moreau de 
Maupertuis, “Les loix du mouvement et du repos déduites d’un principe métaphysique,” 
Histoire de l’Académie Royale des Sciences et Belles Lettres, 1746 (Berlin, 1748), 285. 
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causes with the fundamental truths of mechanics”.51 Then in his article on “Final Causes” 
in the Encyclopédie, fully apprised of Maupertuis’ earlier criticisms of Leibniz and 
Fermat, d’Alembert claims “if it is dangerous to have recourse to final causes a priori in 
order to discover the laws of phenomena, it nonetheless has its uses”.52 Finally, the 
extended positive discussions of metaphysics in the Elements of Philosophy that were 
written in the very year that the second edition of the Treatise on Dynamics came out 
further undermine Terrall’s “anti-metaphysical” interpretation of d’Alembert. 
It is clear, therefore, that metaphysics had a central role in d’Alembert’s mature 
conception of the nature of the sciences. In its most general form it was a kind of meta-
discipline that provided the principles for all the sciences. It would only be natural, 
therefore, for him to commit to a form of Principle Minimalism within metaphysics 
itself. This is precisely what Maupertuis offered in his treatment of the Principle of 
Least Action in his aptly titled “The laws of motion and rest deduced from a 
metaphysical principle” of 1748 and his Essay on Cosmology of 1750. In these works 
the one unique principle was: “When there is a change in nature, the quantity of action 
necessary for this change is the smallest possible”.53 D’Alembert knew these works well 
and discusses Maupertuis’ approach to the Principle of Least Action in the Essay on 
Cosmology in detail in his article “Cosmology” in the Encyclopedia. There, however, 
rather than committing to any determinate ultimate principle of nature, d’Alembert 
suggests only that “[p]erhaps (and this is possibly true) there is a general law which is 
and will always be unknown, one for which we only see particular consequences both 
                                               
51 Diderot and D’Alembert, Encyclopédie, 1: 119.  
52 Diderot and D’Alembert, Encyclopédie, 2: 789. 
53 Maupertuis, “Les loix du movement,” 290.  
Forthcoming in Rethinking the Enlightenment: Between History, Politics, and Philosophy  
eds G. Boucher and H. M. Lloyd, Lanham: Lexington, 2018 
 
28 
obscure and limited that prohibit us from calling them general laws”.54 According to 
d’Alembert, our lack of epistemic access to this general law or ultimate principle results 
from our inability to perceive all the links in the chain of knowledge and so the ultimate 
principle remains an ideal for d’Alembert, one that perhaps humankind will never reach.
       
When it comes our prospects of discovering the principles of the individual 
sciences, however, d’Alembert is far more sanguine. His “Preliminary Discourse” to the 
Encyclopedia opens with an explanation the aims of the whole projected enterprise in 
relation to the project’s title. In the second paragraph, that is, on the first page of the 
Encyclopedia itself, he writes the following: 
The work whose first volume we are presenting today has two aims. As an 
Encyclopedia, it is to set forth as well as possible the order and connection of the 
parts of human knowledge. 
And here is the interesting claim: 
As a Reasoned Dictionary of the Sciences, Arts, and Trades [i.e. picking up the 
second part of the title of the work], it is to contain the general principles that 
form the basis of each science and each art, liberal or mechanical, and the most 
essential facts that make up the body and substance of each.55 
Then in his “Advertisement” to the third volume of the Encyclopedia he reiterates the 
claim:  
                                               
54 Diderot and D’Alembert, Encyclopédie, 4: 294.  
55 Diderot and D’Alembert, Encyclopédie, 1: I (my emphasis).  
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The metaphysics of the sciences –– because there is no science which has not its 
own metaphysics, founded on simple principles and on notions that are common 
to all men –– will be, we hope, one of the principle merits of this volume. (E 3: 
v) 
I conclude that the Enlightenment was indeed a Principled Enlightenment! 
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